You Know Sink the Maine Again or Something

Sheldon Grand. Stern served as historian at the JFK Library in Boston from 1977 to 2000. He is the author of Averting 'the Last Failure': John F. Kennedy and the Secret Cuban Missile Crisis Meetings (2003), The Calendar week the Globe Stood Still: Inside the Hush-hush Cuban Missile Crisis (2005) and The Cuban Missile Crisis in American Retentiveness: Myths vs. Reality (2012) in the Stanford University Printing Nuclear Age Series. Dr. Stern was the first historian and non- ExComm participant to listen to and evaluate the so-classified Cuban Missile Crunch recordings.

Response to Matthew Hayes: "Robert Kennedy and the Cuban Missile Crunch: A Reassertion of Robert Kennedy'due south Part equally the President'due south 'Indispensable Partner' in the Successful Resolution of the Crisis," History, The Historical Clan and John Wiley and Sons Ltd (May 7, 2019), 473-503 and "RFK'due south Secret Role in the Cuban Missile Crisis," Scientific American (August vi, 2019).

I was naturally intrigued when I learned nigh a purportedly new take on Robert Kennedy's role in the Cuban Missile crunch. The unique personal/official human relationship between President John F. Kennedy and his younger brother Robert has been thoroughly explored in dozens of studies over the last half century. RFK'southward "portfolio," widely understood at the time, was that of JFK's well-nigh trusted adviser and confidant—and, every bit Hayes suggests, "the president's de facto main of staff." A different attorney full general would likely not even have been invited to take role in surreptitious discussions during a dangerous strange policy crisis. The loyalty and trust betwixt the Kennedy brothers will surely remain a one-off in the history of the American presidency.

Matthew Hayes' piece of work confirms the already well-documented story of RFK'southward unique role, peculiarly his JFK-approved dorsum-channel contacts with Soviet diplomats before, during and after the missile crisis; he emphasizes, withal, the importance of the more than iii,500 recently declassified documents which ostend that the chaser general was overseeing interdepartmental planning for possible contingencies in Cuba—including "the installation of missile sites" and "warning his brother of the possibility over a year earlier the crisis." [Scientific American2 (5 page printout); futureSA] Hayes cites Cuba-related documents which undeniably confirm that RFK was non your conventional chaser general. These examples augment the historical tape but neglect to provide annihilationgenuinely newabout the bond between President Kennedy and the brother eight years his junior. [History32-35, 38,42; hereafterHY]

"In the first days of the crunch," referring directly to the ExComm tapes, Hayes contends that RFK "insisted that an invasion remain on the table and even pushed for a reduction in lead time required to initiate i.Until recently(italics added) this approach was held up as evidence for a argumentative, hawkish adviser, promoting the sort of military machine activeness that would accept led to dangerous escalation." (SAthree) In fact, from 1962 to the declassification of the White House record recordings in the belatedly 1990s, historians took for granted that RFK was thetop doveat the meetings—mainly considering of his posthumous 1969 memoir,Thirteen Days(which has never been out of print). Hayes declares that:

He saw his role equally pressing for all alternatives, regardless of where they might pb. … he was instrumental in convincing other directorate of its [the naval blockade's] claim and, ultimately, the president. In both cases he was able to do so because he was seen as balancing resolve with restraint, bridging the more forceful approach advocated past the armed forces and Articulation Chiefs with the optimistic affairs pushed by dovish advisers such as U.N. Administrator Adlai Stevenson."[SAthree]

The quote above is a historical rope of sand. RFK merely briefly and reluctantly backed the occludent and continued to grumble virtually it well later on the president had endorsed it; he certainly did not convince the JCS to support it: they never did. There is no escaping or rationalizing the facts—the tapes accept irrefutably identified RFK as i of the most contentious ExComm hawks—from day i to day 13. Hayes is, in effect, turning the historiography of the missile crisis upside downwards, as if these new documents ["Until recently"] can somehow explain away the substance and tone of what Robert Kennedy actually and repeatedly said in the recorded meetings—just carefully concealed in13 Days. RFK's function every bit chair of the Special Group Augmented, fifty-fifty more thoroughly documented since 2012, (https://www.jfklibrary.org/asset-viewer/archives/RFKAG) is entirely consistent with his hawkish views in the ExComm meetings—in which he certainly didnotreveal an "innate agreement of the missile crisis equally more a political struggle than a armed services one, with its ain limitations." [SA2;HY480] Hayes' nebulous merits that these "declassified individual notes and a closer understanding of the brothers' intimate human relationship, now back up a more than holistic view of RFK," fails to even dent the indisputable historical tape on the White Firm tapes.

RFK's key responsibilities included chairing the Special Group Augmented which coordinated Operation Mongoose in Cuba, overseeing industrial and agronomical sabotage, which some historians have chosen 'state-sponsored terrorism,' too every bit attempts to assassinate Fidel Castro. Richard Helms, CIA deputy managing director for operations, recalled: "If anybody wants to come across the whiplashes across my dorsum inflicted by Bobby Kennedy, I volition take my shirt off in public." A senior Mongoose planner agreed, "That's how he [RFK] felt about this stuff. It was unbelievable. I have never been in anything like that before or since and I don't ever desire to go through information technology again." [Stern,Averting the Final Failure14; hereafterAV] Hayes never even mentions the Special Group Augmented.

Hayes' discussion of the "Trollope Ploy," (hereafter TP: a reference to a plot device in a 19th century Anthony Trollope novel) is fifty-fifty more problematic. He explains the TP equally "a bold strategy for navigating two different proposals from Khrushchev…inside the space of a few hours." The first (late on 10/26) promised to remove the missiles if the Us pledged not to invade Cuba; the second (early 10/27), asserted publicly on Moscow Radio that the missiles would exist removed if the US withdrew the Jupiter missiles from Turkey. "RFK took agree of the state of affairs," Hayes concludes, "bold the leadership drape." He and the president'due south chief speechwriter, Ted Sorensen, went into a separate room and came up with what Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. called an idea of "breathtaking simplicity:" "nosotros ignore the latest [10/27] Khrushchev letter [Hayes incorrectly substitutes "while barely acknowledging receipt of the second"] and answer to his earlier [ten/26] letter'south proposal." [SA4;Thirteen Days,1971 edition,77] "JFK canonical the ploy," and sent RFK to make what Hayes calls a "highly secret assurance to [Soviet Ambassador] Dobrynin that the missiles would be removed 'at a later date.'"

This account, however,is not what happened!The tapes reveal conclusively that JFK remained very skeptical and only grudgingly and unenthusiastically agreed "to endeavour this thing [the TP];" but also demanded new contacts with Turkey and NATO to convince them to give up the Jupiters because Khrushchev "had moved on" and could not go dorsum to his earlier demand for a non-invasion pledge after his public statement about a trade. The entire ExComm—very much including RFK—continued tovigorously oppose the merchandise. The real breakthrough did not occur until the tardily evening rump meeting (about xx minutes) of vii ExComm members, called and invited past the president himself. (JFK failed to activate the tape recorder and we will never know if he acted deliberately or but forgot.) Secretarial assistant of Country Dean Rusk, finally acknowledging the president'southward conclusion about giving up the missiles in Turkey, suggested requiring that the Soviets keep the bandy secret; the president accepted this recommendation and everyone finally acquiesced—however reluctantly. The president, in brusk, never let go of "the leadership drapery." As Barton Bernstein observed, "they were the president's men and he wasthe president." [AV369]

It was JFK himself who offset utilized the TP myth. Just hours after Khrushchev had agreed on 10/28 to the removal of the missiles in Cuba, the president phoned his three White House predecessors (Eisenhower, Truman, and Hoover) and skillfully lied to them, challenge that Khrushchev had retreated from the ten/27 missile trade proposal and had agreed, in the cease, to remove the Cuba missiles in commutation for a not-invasion pledge. Eisenhower, who had dealt with Khrushchev, was skeptical and asked if the Soviet leader had demanded additional concessions; JFK coolly repeated the contrived assistants cover story. The same version was fed to a gullible printing corps and quickly became the conventional wisdom, later enshrined inThirteen Days. [AV388]

Hayes criticizes my work for "dismissing the accounts of early [missile crunch] historians such equally Schlesinger as 'profoundly misleading if not out-and-out deceptive.'" [HY476] This accusation is irresponsible as well as fake. First, the quoted passage really refers toi documentfrom the start mean solar day of the ExComm meetings found in RFK's papers by Schlesinger (granted special access by the family in the 1970s). 2d, I explicitly warned readers that "Schlesinger could not have known the total context of the RFK quote" at the fourth dimension because the tapes were withal classified. My judgment has nothing whatsoever to do with the 'early [missile crisis] historians.' If there is deception here, the deception was neither Schlesinger's nor mine. [AM34-v]

"Historians such as Sheldon Stern," Hayes maintains, "have argued that President Kennedy 'bore a substantial share of the responsibility'" for precipitating the crunch. Hayes, however, chooses to call the missile crunch one of the Kennedy assistants's "primary moments of glory" and "a heroic and ingenious defense against Soviet aggression." [HA476]

This "moment of celebrity," "heroic and ingenious" language is unprofessional advocacy, bordering on hagiography, and is particularly inexplainable because at that place is a huge amount of bear witness (including in Soviet archives) which confirms Khrushchev'south claim that the missiles were sent to Republic of cuba to defend Castro against a 2nd U.s.a.-backed invasion. Hayes, however, dances around RFK'southward dominant part in the Special Group Augmented and Functioning Mongoose, which in reality aimed "to undermine the Cuban regime and economy by blowing up port and oil storage facilities, burning crops (peculiarly sugarcane) and even disabling or assassinating Castro himself. … Information technology became the largest cloak-and-dagger operation in CIA history up to that time, 'involving some 400 agents, an annual budget of over $fifty million.'" [AV15] Hayes acknowledges that RFK was the president'southward "eyes and ears in Mongoose," (HY495) only otherwise ignores RFK's fervent leadership office in that effort.

"Stern," Hayes complains, "continues to quote a second-manus exchange between RFK and Kenneth O'Donnell, JFK's special assistant and confidant during the crisis, to undermine the veracity of RFK's memoirThirteen Days." After reading the manuscript, "O'Donnell is said to accept exclaimed, 'I thought your brother was president during the missile crisis!', while RFK replied, 'He's not running [for office], and I am.'" Hayes insists that this business relationship "by someone who didn't participate in most of the ExComm meetings should surely not be given and then much prominence." [HY478] This is an apples and oranges statement: the remark isnotnigh the meetings or the crisis, merely instead about O'Donnell's shrewd insight into RFK'due south personal, political motives in writing his memoir. (Of the four people present, the surviving two I consulted vividly recalled and confirmed each other's account.)

That ambition is precisely what O'Donnell, known for his candor and directness, immediately perceived and RFK promptly admitted. RFK initially intended this crunch memoir for publication during JFK's 1964 reelection campaign, only changed his purpose subsequently Dallas. Bobby'south ambition, in fact, had even surfaced during the crunch itself. On Oct 29, Administrator Dobrynin gave the attorney general a letter from Khrushchev to the president which specifically mentioned the missile trade. RFK consulted with JFK and returned the letter, reminding Dobrynin that the swap was to remain secret—and explaining that he personally could not "take a chance getting involved in the transmission of this sort of letter, since who knows where and when such letters can surface or exist somehow published—not now, but in the future…. The advent of such a document could cause irreparable impairment to my political career in the future." [AV403] The O'Donnell/RFK exchange is an entirely legitimate asset of historical evidence and Hayes' objection is disingenuous special pleading.

"Critics such as Stern," Hayes continues,[HY483-4]

far from viewing RFK every bit a leader of the doves (through his support for the blockade route), indicate to the primary source material and abet his function as a dangerous hawk advocating invasion from the outset.

In evidence for this assertion, Stern directly quotes RFK: 'We should just go into it, and get information technology over with and take our losses if [Khrushchev] wants to get into a war over this.'… Stern argues that RFK'southward memoir of the crisis 'was an effort to manipulate this history of the missiles crisis and invent the past. A 'consistently hawkish' figure emerges from Stern's analysis of RFK, 'i in sharp contrast to his brother.'

I don't "view" RFK as "the leader of the doves" because he was not; he accepted the blockade only later on JFK publicly announced information technology. I plead guilty every bit charged to pointing "to the primary source material," the tapes, to show conclusively (not to "abet") that RFK was a hawk on the offset day and was still pressing to "take Republic of cuba dorsum" militarily on the thirteenth day. The "consistently hawkish figure" that rankles Hayes was not invented by "Stern'southward analysis"—simply derived from RFK's own words captured on the ExComm tapes, words which he spunvery differently in his memoir. The assertion that 'I was there' is well-nigh often a carmine flag for historical manipulation, not a superior form of validation. History based on private retentiveness rarely rises above the personal motives for writing information technology.Xiii Daysand the tape recordings cannot both exist correct, and in that location is absolutely no question which business relationship is reliable.

Hayes, however, cites a specific case to allege that "this analysis is skewed, for Stern quotes RFK out of context, paring back RFK's words selectively to support his argument." The indented quote below, he claims, "really begins with a series of qualifications, equally RFKtentatively hedges his comments."

Now [think] whether it wouldn't be the argument, if you're going to go into information technology at all, whether we should just get into it, and go information technology over with, and accept our losses. And if [Khrushchev] wants to get into a war over this . . . Hell, if it's war that's gonna come on this thing, he sticks those kinds of missiles in after the warning, and so he'due south gonna get into a war over six months from now, or a twelvemonth from now…. [HY483]

Accusing a scholar of "selectively" using bear witness "to back up an statement," is a serious personal and professional allegation—especially when untrue. This passage is not, as Hayes is determined to "prove"  in spite of the ExComm tapes, some 1-off, devil's advocate musing by Bobby earlier he settled on a dovish line; rather, it is typical of his approach through the entire crunch. I just relistened to this tape and there is no question that before the "go into it" comment RFK is overtly scoffing at all suggestions of more than express activity (such as air strikes) rather than invasion. Indeed, calculation the "Now [think]…." sentence makes no change whatsoever in the pregnant of his remarks. He is not "tentatively" hedging anything. In fact, Bobby makes his position abundantly clear minutes subsequently, suggesting that the assistants could stage an incident that would justify military machine intervention: "You know, sink theMaineover again or something." I included the 'sink theMaine' statement later on in my narrative – yet Hayes leaves it out entirely. A reader might reasonably ask merely whose version is skewed and selective.

Equally important, the indented quote above commencement appeared in the 1997 May-Zelikow transcripts, which I was the first to publicly expose every bit seriously flawed and unreliable. (AV,' Appendix, 427-439.) Nix in the Hayes articles suggests that he is fifty-fifty aware of the ensuing controversy. No historian genuinely familiar with the crunch literature would trust the 1997 version, which the editors themselves finally best-selling has been superseded by the much-improved 2001 Miller Centre transcripts.

Hayes also accepts RFK's claim inThirteen Daysthat "many meetings" of the ExComm took place "without the President." [HY491] I listened to every recorded meeting numerous times over ii years (including the crucial "postal service-crunch" meetings that continued into late Nov)—as well as checking passages in the original White Firm master recordings against the copies used for research and studying the minutes of the unrecorded meetings. JFK definitely attended every ExComm meeting, except during brief campaign trips to New England (10/17) and the Midwest (x/20).

The November post-crisis lasted longer (32 days) and required more recorded meetings (24 vs. xix) than the iconic Thirteen Days. [AV403-12] The naval occludent remained in place and tensions remained high after 10/28. Negotiations at the Un bankrupt downwards over Soviet resistance to removing the IL-28 nuclear bombers from Cuba and the deadlock was non resolved until 11/20. JFK then ordered the lifting of the blockade, but not before RFK persuaded him to drop the non-invasion pledge: "I don't recall," RFK insisted, "that we owe anything as far as Khrushchev is concerned." The president worried that it would "wait too much like we're welching" on our promise and added that retaining the pledge might "make it politically less hard for Khrushchev to withdraw his conventional forces from Cuba." In the end, however, JFK agreed to his brother's tougher stance. Bobby was Bobby, hawkish to the last. Hayes never fifty-fifty mentions the November post-crisis—in issue leaving out everything after the 9th inning in the account of an extra-inning game—a fitting metaphor for these essays. [AV410]. (1)

(one) When I began listening to the tapes I did non await that they would fatally undermine the veracity ofxiii Days. I had worked in RFK'southward presidential campaign, convinced that he was a very unlike human being than in 1962. However, as a historian, I had to confront the evidence on the tapes. I admired Bobby in 1968, and still do.

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Source: https://historynewsnetwork.org/article/172974

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